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Aug., 1952
PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
ESTATES OF MENTAL INCOMPETENTS
RICHARD P. BROWN
of the Denver Bar
This article will assume that adjudication of the incompetent
and appointment of a conservator have already been accomplished.
The discussion will be directed to the practical aspects of the
conservator's problems, with consideration of detailed legal ques-
tions left, of necessity, to the practitioner as he encounters them.
As a background to the consideration of the conservator's
problems, it is desirable to understand the source and nature of
his powers and duties. The conservator is an officer of the court
appointing him, both the court and the conservator deriving their
powers from the statutes of the jurisdiction. Being an officer of
the court, and serving in a fiduciary relationship to the ward, the
conservator owes to the court, and to his ward, the duties of the
highest fidelity, good faith, and whole-hearted service. Serving in
a statutory office, the conservator's powers are limited to those
given him by statute and proper order of court and inherent or
implied powers are few. The position of a conservator is generally
considered to be somewhat between that of an agent and that of
an administrator. A conservator acts on behalf of the ward, who
is a living person, subject to suit and retaining title to his own
property. In this light the conservator appears to be an agent,
but the mental competence of the principal and the voluntary char-
acter of the relationship, both necessary to a true agency, are
lacking. A conservator is appointed by, and subject to the juris-
diction of, a court. He is given many of the same duties, powers,
and responsibilities of the administrator of a decedent's estate,
and the laws governing his rights and duties are inextricably bound
with those relative to executors and administrators; yet the estate
of an incompetent is not a legal entity, separate and apart from
the incompetent, as in the estate of a decedent, and the transmis-
sion of the ward's property to his heirs, legatees, or devisees is
not a portion of the conservator's duties. Thus, in spite of its
resemblence to an agency and to an administration, a conservator-
ship is neither, but is a separate and distinct type of legal relation-
ship.
CARE AND SUPPORT OF THE WARD AND OTHERS
Ordinarily, the order adjudicating the incompetent will com-
mit his care and custody to an appropriate person or institution.
The primary responsibility for the personal care and custody will
rest with that person or institution. It is, however, the duty of
the conservator to be at all times cognizant of the care and treat-
ment his ward is receiving, and to assure himself that such care
and treatment are the best obtainable consistent with the condi-
tion of the ward and the means available for that purpose. He
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should make application to the court of his appointment for orders
authorizing such expenditures as are necessary for this purpose
and if at any time a change in the custody of the ward appears
desirable, should make application to the court therefor.
Our statutes provide specifically that the court may set over
to the wife of the ward such articles of personal property as in its
discretion it deems necessary for the use of the wife and children
of the ward, and may make further allowances to the wife for
her support, and the support and education of the minor children,
such sums to be paid at such times and in such amounts as the
court may direct. This statutory authorization of allowance to
the wife and children is not considered to be exclusive. There is
a surprisingly extensive body of law to the general effect that
the assets of the ward may be used to support adult children, par-
ents, grandchildren, and others more distantly related, where it
can be made to appear to the court that the assets of the ward
are sufficient to justify these expenditures without jeopardizing
the future care of the ward and those legally dependent upon
him, and it can be established to the satisfaction of the court that
the ward, had he remained competent, would in all probability
have supported such person or persons. This latter showing is
generally made by proving that the ward, prior to his adjudica-
tion, had in fact supported them and had by word or deed clearly
indicated an intention to continue their support.
INCOME TAXES
The ward's income tax status is not changed by the fact of
his adjudication or by the appointment of his conservator, and
the estate of the incompetent is not a separate tax-paying entity,
as is the estate of a deceased person. The ward retains the same
rights, so far as exemptions and deductions are concerned, that
he had prior to his adjudication. It is the duty of the conservator
to file both Federal and state income tax returns on behalf of the
ward in the manner and within the time required by the respec-
tive Federal and state laws. The return should be filed in the name
of the ward, or, if it is advantageous (as it probably will be) to
file a joint return, in the name of the ward and his spouse. The
Federal return is due on the same date as individual returns and
not on April 15, as is the case with fiduciary returns. Failure of
the conservator to discharge these duties properly may result in
the conservator becoming personally liable for the taxes due.
FEES
Until 1941 the fee chargeable by a conservator was limited
by Section 232 of Chapter 176 C.S.A., regardless of the period
of time through which the conservatorship might be continued.
In 1941 the legislature enacted what now appears as Section 89 (5)
of Chapter 176, which permits the court to order additional com-
pensation to be paid to a conservator where the administration
continues for more than one year. It is customary for both cor-
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porate and individual conservators to make a charge on account
of their total fees at yearly or other intervals and, upon the con-
clusion of the administration, whether occasioned by the death or
restoration to reason of the ward, or by the exhaustion of the
ward's assets, to charge such additional fee as will bring the total
of the fees charged up to a reasonable compensation for the whole
of the services rendered during the period of administration of
the estate. There are no statutes regulating the fees of attorneys
in estates of mental incompetents. The minimum fee provisions
relative to estates, included in the schedule adopted by the Denver
Bar Association at its May 5, 1952 meeting, are generally con-
sidered to apply to estates of mental incompetents, and, in deter-
mining the aggregate of the fees to be charged for the whole ad-
ministration of the estate, attorneys will properly take into consid-
eration the duration of the estate, as well as the other factors
customarily considered in fixing a fee.
INVESTMENTS AND RETENTION OF ASSETS
Subject to qualifications hereinafter set out concerning the
administration of the estates of wards of the Veterans Adminis-
tration, the powers and duties of conservators, with reference to
the investment of the funds of their wards, and the retention of
the assets owned by their wards, are identical with those of execu-
tors (except as their powers are enlarged by will), administrators,
and guardians, and are set forth in the chapter of the Session
Laws of 1951 adopting the "Prudent Man" rule in Colorado.' The
objective of the conservator's dealings with assets of the ward,
however, is substantially different from that of an executor or
administrator, who is mainly concerned with the preservation
of a decedent's assets through a relatively short period of admin-
istration. A conservator, in determining investment policy, must
adopt a longer range view point, as it is his duty to invest and
reinvest the assets of the ward's estate in a manner consistent
with the best interests of the ward and those dependent upon him
over a period of time, which will in all probability not end until
the death of the ward. In proper exercise of the broad discretions
granted a conservator by the "Prudent Man" rule the conservator
should give careful consideration to all pertinent facts, such as
the ward's age, physical condition, possibility of restoration of
reason, former standard of living, and the apparent requirements
of those dependent upon the ward for funds, and determine upon
an investment policy which will best permit an estate the size of
the ward's to meet the needs which those facts forecast.
ELECTION WITH REFERENCE TO WILL OF DECEASED SPOUSE
Should the spouse of the ward die, testate, during the lifetime
of the ward, the ward, as the surviving spouse, may elect to receive
one-half of the decedent's estate in lieu of the provisions made
by will, or, by failing to make such election within the allotted
six months period, become bound by the terms of the will. Section
I SESSON LAWS OF COLORADO 1951, Chap. 297, sec. 1, p. 840.
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37 (b) of Chapter 176 C.S.A. makes it the duty of the conservator
to ascertain the relative benefits to the ward obtainable under the
will and under the statute, and to report thereon to the court, which
will make the election for the ward.
Where the will of the deceased spouse contains provisions leav-
ing definite amounts, or properties, or a fixed fraction of the estate,
to the ward, the conservator's job (and that of the court) is sim-
ple. Where, however, the provision for the ward is a life estate,
or a beneficial interest in a testamentary trust, computation of
the value of the rights of the ward thereunder may be difficult and
the court may have a difficult problem in judgment. The problem
is further complicated in the case of a will which creates a trust
from which the trustee is authorized to use income or principal
up to the whole of the trust for the support of the ward. Thus,
if an election to take against a will would result in an outright
addition of $50,000 to the ward's estate, while an acceptance of
the provisions of the will would result in a $100,000 trust being
held for the benefit of the ward, to be expended on behalf of the
ward if and when necessary, with the unexpended balance to go
over to other beneficiaries upon the death of the ward, the court
would have to weigh the relative advantages of the two possibili-
ties. While the court will reach individual decisions upon individaul
facts, such experience as the writer has had indicates that the
court will be, and should be, more interested in assuring the great-
est security to the ward than in increasing the ward's estate, and
would elect to accept the benefits provided by the will.
.If the conservator has an adverse interest, the court is di-
rected to appoint some other suitable person to discharge this duty.
UNIFORM VETERANS GUARDIANSHIP ACT
The Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act, as adopted by our
legislature in 1945,2 applies to the estates of mental incompetents,
as well as to those of minors, and if the ward is a beneficiary of
the Veterans Administration the provisions of the act apply to
his estate, or at least to the portion thereof which is attributable
to funds having their origin in veterans' benefits. A full dress
review of the U.V.G.A. is not appropriate here, but certain specific
provisions deserve attention. The investment provisions in Sdc-
tion 13 of that act are not superseded by the recent legislative
adoption of the so-called "Prudent Man" rule, and investment of
the funds of the ward, so far as they are attributable to V.A.
sources, is still governed by Section 13 of U.V.G.A., and by the
laws governing investments by fiduciaries at the time of the adop-
tion of the U.V.G.A.
Compensation of the conservator, so far as derived from V.A.
funds, or the product thereof, may not exceed five per cent of the
income upon such funds for the period covered by the fee, except
in the case of extraordinary services by the conservator, in which
case an additional fee may be allowed by court order. Other pro-
' CSA, vol. 4B, ch. 150, sec. 55 (1-21).
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visions of the act require service of notices, petitions, accountings,
and the like, upon the Veterans Administration.
It frequently occurs that a portion of the ward's estate is
derived from veterans' benefits, while the remainder is derived
from other sources. In this case the portion of the estate attributa-
ble to veterans' benefits is subject to the U.V.G.A., while the re-
minder is not. Because of the restrictive investment provisions
of the U.V.G.A., it is often desirable, if the estate is of reasonable
size, to separate the two portions of the estate, keeping entirely
separate accountings as to the two portions, and to administer
the portion attributable to veterans' benefits in accordance with
the U.V.G.A.; the other portion may be administered without re-
gard to the U.V.G.A. This procedure will permit full compliance
with the U.V.G.A. as to the portion of the estate to which it applies,
without restricting the conservator's investments and adding to
his procedural burdens as to the remainder of the estate.
CONTINUATION OF THE ESTATE AFTER THE DEATH OF THE WARD
Section 89 (5) of Chapter 176 C.S.A., hereinabove referred
to in connection with fees, provides in a most sketchy manner for
the continuation of the administration of an incompetent's estate
after his death. The statute provides no guide for court, conserva-
tor, executor, or administrator, and the Supreme Court has never
been called upon to interpret the statute or supply the detail which
it lacks. The county courts, through a process of careful explora-
tion of the matter, seem to have arrived at the uniform conclusion
that the statute means little more than that the administration of
the decedent's estate shall have the same file number as that of
the incompetent's estate, and that the papers of both shall be filed
in the same jacket.
Customary procedure, dictated in large measure by natural
caution and the indefiniteness of the statute, calls for the filing
of a petition for letters testamentary or of administration upon
the death of the incompetent, the admission to probate of the
will, if there be one, and the issuance of letters to the executor or
administrator. Notice to creditors is published as required by law
and a sepaarte inventory is filed. Meanwhile, the conservator is
publishing notice of the final settlement of his accounts, will file
his final report, and, upon the entry of an order of final settle-
ment, will deliver the assets in his hands to the executor or admin-
istrator, and be discharged. The clerks of the county courts firm
up the separation of the two administrations by charging a new
docket fee upon the filing of the petition for letters, after the
ward's death.
There is a period of time during which the conservator, and
the executor or administrator, both hold office. During this period
the conservator is largely shorn of his powers by reason of the
death of the ward. He may, however, upon order of court, take
such steps as may be necessary to the protection of assets of the
ward, pending delivery thereof to the executor or administrator.
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The executor or administrator, during this period, is entitled to
exercise all the powers granted by law, or by the will, as to assets
under his control, and the power to act, during this period of
overlapping powers, is determined, as to any given asset, by the
power to control that asset.
PROPERTY DISPOSED OF BY THE INCOMPETENT'S WILL
An interesting problem may be presented in the case where
the ward, prior to his adjudication, has executed a will.
Let us suppose that the will leaves specified securities to A
and that, in the opinion of the conservator, retention of those se-
curities as a part of the ward's estate is not consistent with sound
judgment. What are the conservator's duties, and what is the effect
of a sale by the conservator? It appears clear that the conserva-
tor is bound to manage the estate in the best interest of the ward
only, and should not permit his judgment to be varied by the fact
that following it may operate to adeem a legacy provided by the
ward's will. He should apply to the court for an order to sell.
The question of whether a sale under such circumstances
adeems the legacy has not been decided by our Supreme Court.
Authorities in other states are divided. Some jurisdictions, which
consider that ademption or not is a matter of testatorial intent,
hold that the ward cannot have intended an ademption, and that
none has occurred. Other jurisdictions, holding that ademption
depends not on intention but upon the bald fact of disposition of
the property before death, hold that a sale by a conservator works
an ademption of the legacy. The county court of one of the larger
counties of the state recently entered an order, without notice,
which adopted the theory that no ademption was accomplished by
such a sale, and ordered the executor to pay in cash to a legatee
a sum calculated to restore to the legatee a diminution in value
occasioned by the conservator's action in redeeming certain U.S.
Savings Bonds, which were left to the legatee, and the subsequent
purchase, with the proceeds from such redemption, of other similar
bonds which were ordered delivered to the legatee.
In the solution of all these problems the conservator should
obtain such orders of court as may be necessary to protect him in
the course which he intends to pursue and noticing in individuals
who appear to have a* potential interest in the ward's assets in the
event of his death. All expenditures made by the conservator should
be pursuant to order of court properly entered, or at least within
the framework of a general order, authorizing the conservator to
make expenditures of a given general character. The conservator
will find that many of the problems presented to him involve the
personal feelings of the individuals with whom he deals more
deeply than he suspects, and a large measure of human understand-
ing and tact will be the greatest single factor in solving many of
his problems.
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